The “Tavria” offensive operation by the Defense Forces of Ukraine (June–September 2023): idea, background, causes of failure and after-action review lessons

Abstract

The aim of research is to conduct a complex scientific and analytical analysis of the “Tavria” offensive operation by the Defense Forces of Ukraine (DFU) (June-September 2023): reconstruct the operational aim and the origin of how it formed; describe the background and “a window of opportunity”; explore the conditions of the engineering fortifications of the armed forces of russian federation; analyse the role of external political factors and the limitations within the Biden’s administration system; identify the miscalculations of military political leadership of Ukraine; systematize the lessons that were drawn by both sides from the operation for the further combat actions. Methodology of the research is based onfundamental historical approach principles, principles of systematicity and scientific objectivity. The research was conducted using the logical, analytical and synthetic methods, as well as the  chronological approach, comparative analysis and problem-thematic method. The dataset consists of open source materials such as: reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), IISS, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal articles; analytical materials of CSIS and War on the Rocks (WOTR); memoirs and interviews of the live witnesses; satellite monitoring data of such companies as Planet Earth and Maxar. Scientific novelty of this research is the conducting of systematic analysis of the “Tavria” offensive operation for the first time in Ukrainian military and strategic thought within the framework of the unity of operational, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions; determining the complex nature of its failure as a result of five factors - a lack of time resources, the shortage of specialized breach equipment, the incomplete cohesion of military units, systemic constraints imposed by the U.S., and miscalculations by the military-political leadership;  clarified the role of Biden’s administration "drip-feed" doctrine with the firepower constraints for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in the course of operation; analysed the systemic nature of adaptation of armed forces of russian federation after the engineering, tactical and operational failures of 2022. Conclusions.The concept of operations was strategically reasoned and logically coherent, but its implementation faced the systemic ambition-resource gap in five key factors. The “window of opportunity” was open during the winter-spring time of 2022-2023 but closed sooner than when the strike force could reach the required combat readiness. Surovikin Line of defense became a new problem compared to the ones the AFU ran into in the previous successful operations. The systemic nature of the US restrictions had an indisputable effect on the result. The lessons learned from the operation retain their conceptual significance for the offensive operations doctrine under conditions of intense suppression and a deeply echeloned mine and fire defense.