Institutional and Network Architecture of Russian Propaganda in Europe: An Analytical Insight Through the Prism of EU Information Policy

Abstract

This study aims to conduct a comprehensive historical and political deconstruction of the institutional and network architecture of Russian informational influence within the European Union countries during the period of 2014–2022. It focuses on exploring the causal relationships, historical stages, and operational logic driving the transformation of the EU’s information policy from a model of liberal neutrality toward a concept of strict administrative and legal deterrence of hybrid threats. Concurrently, the paper determines the role of Ukraine as an active security donor to the European information space amid ongoing authoritarian aggression.

The methodological framework relies on a combination of general scientific and special historical methods governed by the principles of objectivity, systematicity, and historicism. The historical-genetic method allowed for tracking the evolution of the EU's defensive security instruments in chronological sequence. The structural-functional method was employed to partition the Russian propaganda apparatus into distinct functional levels and interconnected operational segments. Political-legal analysis enabled an evaluation of the normative shifts within the EU common legal framework, particularly the transition from the voluntary self-regulation of Big Tech platforms to direct sanctions, while the comparative-historical method helped to reveal the specificities of perceiving hybrid challenges at different stages of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The research proves that the high adaptability of Russian informational pressure within the European Union relied on a three-tier network architecture that effectively integrated official state structures (MFA of the Russian Federation, Rossotrudnichestvo, RT, Sputnik), network proxy agents (local far-right and far-left political parties, compliant think tanks, co-opted opinion leaders), and an extensive digital distribution ecosystem (coordinated botnets, anonymous news aggregators, closed Telegram groups). It is argued that the «Ukrainian issue» between 2014 and 2021 (the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, the 2016 Dutch referendum, the downing of flight MH17) served not merely as an object of aggression but as a strategic testing ground for the Kremlin to refine technologies of social polarization and value-based disruption inside the West. The study identifies three main stages in the evolution of Brussels' information policy: reactive-monitoring (2015–2017), regulatory-institutional (2018–2021), and administrative-legal (since 2022). It demonstrates that the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, dismantled the classic liberal neutrality paradigm of the EU, forcing a definitive transition to proactive digital sovereignty through the complete ban of Russian state channels and the enforcement of the landmark Digital Services Act. Crucially, the practical counter-disinformation experience of Ukrainian state bodies and OSINT communities became a doctrinal foundation for the updated defense policies of the European Union.

Russian disinformation in Europe represents a rigid and deeply institutionalized threat, coordinated by state, rather than a series of isolated media anomalies. Over the 2014–2022 period, the European Union underwent a profound historical evolution, proving its capacity to upgrade the liberal model of its information space toward robust resilience. In this process, Ukraine consolidated its status as a vital security donor and a proactive actor in shaping the new strategic communications architecture across the European continent.