The financial and administrative mechanism for the reclamation of the flooded area of the Kremenchuk Reservoir: a comparative analysis of the Zolotonosha and Chyhyryn districts (1956–1959)

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the financial and economic mechanisms involved in the liquidation of the flooded area of the Kremenchuk Reservoir in 1956–1959 within the Cherkasy Oblast, as well as to identify its structural and regional characteristics using the Zolotonosha and Chyhyryn districts as examples. Particular attention is focused on the study of property inventory and valuation procedures, mechanisms for calculating and paying compensation, as well as the role of the administrative apparatus in the process of forced resettlement of the population.

The source base of the study consists of archival materials, reporting documentation of government bodies, and regulatory and legal acts from the period under study.

The methodological framework consists of comparative, quantitative, and structural-functional analysis, which made it possible to reconstruct the practices of implementing compensation policy, assess the ratio between planned figures and actual payments, and trace the peculiarities of the functioning of appraisal commissions in different regions.

It was established that the system of financial support for resettlement was characterized by structural imbalances between the appraised value of property and actual payments. In particular, compensation covered only 30–40% of the cost of new housing, which led to a significant financial deficit for households. It was found that the advance payment mechanism, which provided for the payment of only a portion of the funds at the initial stage, limited the liquidity of resettlers and complicated the completion of construction. A comparative analysis revealed both common trends and local differences in approaches to property valuation and compensation payments in the Zolotonosha and Chyhyryn districts. It has been demonstrated that financial policy reflected an institutional preference for collective forms of economic management over individual ones. Furthermore, a significant share of administrative costs and instances of formalism in the implementation of related measures were identified, accompanied by reported inflation of indicators and a gap between declared and actual results.

A synthesis of the results obtained provides grounds for asserting that the financial and economic mechanism for the liquidation of the flooded zone operated within the framework of a Soviet modernization model aimed at minimizing state expenditures at the expense of the population. This model caused a systemic gap between planned commitments and their implementation, which manifested itself in insufficient compensation, uneven distribution of resources, and limited effectiveness of social support for resettlers. This resulted in difficulties in restoring housing conditions, increased social inequality, as well as associated ethical and environmental problems related to the project’s implementation.