

Philosophy

UDC 130.2

DOI <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18756983>

**From Rationality to Rationalities: The Modern Epistemological Situation in
Science and Culture**

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Accepted: 07.02.2026 | Published: 24.02.2026

Abstract. *The article provides a philosophical analysis of the evolution of the concept of rationality in the context of the crisis of the classical understanding of Reason as a universal and all-encompassing principle of cognition and activity. The “disenchantment with Reason,” caused by its limited capacity to respond adequately to the challenges of historical and social development, has led to a transition from a monistic model of rationality to a pluralistic understanding of it as a multiplicity of types and forms. It is substantiated that the introduction of the concept of the “type of rationality” reflects an aspiration to extend rationalist analysis beyond scientific knowledge and to encompass a broader range of sociocultural practices. The main typologies of rationality proposed by leading philosophers of the twentieth century are examined, and their methodological multidimensionality and historical conditionality are revealed. Particular attention is devoted to Karl-Otto Apel’s concept of communicative and discursive rationality as an attempt to overcome the limitations of instrumental–strategic thinking and to affirm the ethical dimension of rationality. It is concluded that contemporary philosophy of rationality requires not only further typologization but also the theoretical mediation of competing rationalities in order to form a more holistic and responsible vision of human coexistence under conditions of globalization.*

Keywords: *type of rationality, contemporary science, epistemology, logic, positivism, methodology of science, criteria of rationality, cognitive process.*

**Від раціональності до раціональностей: сучасна епістемологічна
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***Анотація:** Стаття присвячена аналізу раціональності як ключового концепту сучасного наукового та філософського знання. Раціональність розглядається не як універсальна й незмінна норма, а як динамічний, історично та соціокультурно зумовлений феномен, що визначає способи обґрунтування знання, критерії істинності та межі пізнання. У контексті епістемологічних трансформацій ХХ–ХХІ століть показано кризу класичного розуміння раціональності, пов'язаного з ідеалами логічної послідовності, об'єктивності та нейтральності, а також становлення плюралістичного підходу, який визнає співіснування різних типів і форм раціональності. Обґрунтовується теза про історичну, соціокультурну та контекстуальну зумовленість форм раціональності, які не зводяться до формально-логічних процедур, а включають ціннісні, комунікативні, символічні та практичні виміри.*

Проаналізовано історичні передумови фрагментації поняття розуму та витіснення його множинними «раціональностями», що відображають специфіку різних культурних епох, форм діяльності й пізнавальних стратегій. Особливу увагу приділено проблемі типологізації раціональності, її методологічним засадам і класифікаційним критеріям у працях провідних українських філософів М. Поповича, С. Кримського, П. Йолона та європейських філософів, зокрема М. Вебера, Ю. Габермаса, Г. Шнедельбаха, К.-О. Апеля. Розкрито методологічні критерії розмежування типів раціональності – субстанціалістські та нормативістські, теоретичні й практичні, стратегічні, комунікативні та етичні. Особливу увагу приділено ідеї дискурсивної та консенсуально-комунікативної раціональності К.-О. Апеля, як підґрунтя міжсуб'єктної взаємодії, аргументації та етичної відповідальності в умовах глобалізованого світу. Показано, що сучасний філософський дискурс відмовляється від монологічного тлумачення раціональності на користь діалогічних, комунікативних і дискурсивних

моделей, у межах яких раціональність постає як відкрита до критики та саморефлексії. Доведено, що сучасне розуміння раціональності ґрунтується на визнанні множинності її типів і відтінків, жоден з яких не претендує на абсолютну повноту. Раціональність постає як динамічний соціокультурний феномен, відкритий до діалогу, критики та взаємного опосередкування, що робить її релевантним інструментом аналізу наукового пізнання, соціальних практик і форм колективної відповідальності.

Ключові слова: тип раціональності, сучасна наука, епістемологія, логіка, позитивізм, методологія науки, критерії раціональності, пізнавальний процес.

Problem statement. Rationality is one of the fundamental foundations of modern science, since it determines the ways in which knowledge is justified, the criteria of truth, and the limits of cognition. In this context, epistemology functions as the theoretical basis of science, analyzing the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, the mechanisms of its acquisition, and its legitimation. Modern science develops within a field of constant reflection on its own rational foundations, which leads to a revision of classical conceptions of objectivity, universality, and neutrality of scientific knowledge. The classical understanding of rationality, associated with the ideals of logical consistency, demonstrability, and causal explanation, has undergone transformations within the framework of non-classical science. Epistemological studies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have shown that scientific cognition is not a purely formal-logical process, but includes historical, cultural, and social factors. Thus, rationality appears not as a rigid universal norm, but as a dynamic and contextually conditioned form of thinking. Contemporary epistemology emphasizes the pluralism of rationalities, recognizing the coexistence of various cognitive strategies within science. The current stage of development of scientific cognition requires the maximal elaboration of shades of rationality, and

not only its types, which would make it possible to construct a certain typology of rationality, to identify within this typology different kinds of rationality, and to establish connections between them. The present understanding of rationality may be based on the recognition of different types of rationality, each of which does not claim absolute completeness and is open to dialogue, compromise, and criticism. Today, scientific discourse emphasizes the non-constructive character of a monological understanding of the very essence of rationality.

Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. The analysis of the phenomenon of rationality can conventionally be traced back to the emergence of the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, G. Galileo, N. of Cusa, R. Bacon, F. Bacon, R. Descartes, G. Leibniz, I. Kant, and G. Hegel, who laid the foundations of classical scientific rationality. The positivist tradition in the development of philosophy and science is associated with the names of A. Comte, E. Mach, R. Carnap, L. Wittgenstein, K. Popper, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, and P. Feyerabend. The social aspects of the development of rationality were the focus of attention of M. Weber, J. Habermas, K.-O. Apel, and H. Schnädelbach. Representatives of contemporary Ukrainian philosophical thought – M. Popovych, S. Krymskyi, P. Kopnin, P. Yolon, B. Parakhonskyi, I. Bychko, V. Horskyi, T. Hardashuk, A. Konverskyi, I. Dobronravova, N. Viatkyna, V. Kuznietsov, I. Ohorodnyk, Ya. Shramko, L. Ryzhko, L. Sydorenko, I. Polyvoda, and V. Navrotskyi – have examined the problem of rationality from various perspectives, ranging from scientific and logical-methodological to social, political, and historical-cultural ones.

Exposition of the main research content. The problem of rationality has always been at the center of attention of scholars and philosophers throughout all periods of human development, since it has made it possible to comprehend human existence, to reflect on the essence of the world, the expediency of social organization, the logic of cognition, and the adequacy of scientific research. Each historical epoch addressed the problem of rationality on the basis of those cognitive

orientations that were actualized in science as a type of intellectual activity at a given time. The comprehension of the social order of society from the standpoint of the historical type of rationality was no exception. Thus, in the XVII-XVIII centuries, the classical type of rationality prevailed, proceeding from monistic positions in the analysis of phenomena both in science and in society. By contrast, in the XX century, a radical rethinking of scientific and other types of rationality took place in favor of their pluralistic interpretation. At the same time, behind diversity and multiplicity as methodological principles of the contemporary understanding of reality, it is important not to lose systemacity and structural coherence in approaches to the analysis of any problems. Therefore, the typologization of rationality constitutes an important step toward its adequate comprehension at the present stage of the development of knowledge.

The aim of the article is to analyze the contemporary epistemological situation, which is characterized by a plurality of types of rationality.

To achieve the stated goal, the following objectives have been identified:

1. To investigate the reasons for the pluralistic vision of rationality in contemporary philosophical discourse.
2. To analyze the domestic philosophical tradition of distinguishing types of rationality.
3. To examine the approaches of European philosophers to the problem of typologizing rationality.

Presentation of the Main Body of the Study. In philosophical thought, the idea of distinguishing particular kinds, types, and forms of rationality has a long tradition. From the moment when the first doubts about the omnipotence of Reason appeared, multiple “rationalities” began gradually but persistently to displace the concept of “reason” from philosophical discourse. The inability of Reason to provide exhaustive answers to a number of vital challenges facing humanity led to a state of “disenchantment with Reason.” This situation contributed to its internal

fragmentation, as a result of which it appears as a set of diverse “rationalities” – or, as H. Schnädelbach aptly noted, “...rationality has displaced reason.”

The emergence of the concept of the “type of rationality” indicates the need to characterize not only science but also other spheres of human activity as rational, and reflects the aspiration toward rationalism in the broad sense of the word as the capacity of reason to grasp the integral phenomenon of social life. As a rule, this aspiration is not realized. The concept of the “type of rationality” does not lead to the synthesis of these types into an integral rational conception, but rather to the construction of new “rationalisms,” each of which is based on its own foundation.

It should be noted that the identification of ever new types of rationality necessitates their ordering according to certain criteria. One may consider that it is not individual definitions, but precisely their classifications, that form the minimal context in which the idea of rationality, as the essence of the corresponding phenomenon, finds its expression in its concrete forms. The contemporary situation regarding the establishment of different types of rationality, including the definition of the very concept of rationality within corresponding systems, is a sufficiently long process and demonstrates a sphere of activity that is one of the priorities within the field of the humanities.

Today, the concept of the “type of rationality” specifies the particular manifestations of the latter and is often used as a euphemism in order to recognize the rationality of almost all forms of human relations to the world – mystical, emotional, affective, etc. This tendency expressed an intention to expand the boundaries of human freedom beyond those proposed by the liberal model of the Western way of life, beyond the limits set by the image of a rational, autonomous, effective individual, while preserving a positive value-based attitude toward rationality. In order to defend the non-rational and the irrational, it was argued: “These phenomena are also rational; we simply have another type of rationality.”

At the same time, it is precisely such an “expanded” interpretation of rationality that makes it possible to separate rationality from scientificity, involving within the sphere of rationality the most diverse aspects, which in fact become criteria for its typologization. As prominent domestic researchers P. F. Yolon, S. B. Krymskyi, and B. A. Parakhonskyi write, “the recognition of the historicity of forms of rationality presupposes the universal character of the criteria of rationality, on the one hand, and specific conceptions of rationality in each epoch, on the other” [1, p. 82].

Under a historical approach, the content, semantic load, and manifestations of rationality in society depend on the mental environment of a particular historical epoch. It is extremely important for researchers to correlate the content of rationality with the content of the epoch in which it manifests itself. According to the criterion of the dominant worldview of an epoch, expressed in the dichotomy “rational/irrational,” the following historical types of rationality are distinguished:

- true knowledge as opposed to opinion in Antiquity;
- knowledge opposed to faith in medieval philosophy;
- rationality opposed to the dogmatism of prejudices in the Enlightenment, and later to the empirical–intuitionist, sensualist, or irrational (in whatever concrete forms it may be embodied – will, life, instinct, the unconscious).

The analysis of rationality and its historical forms undoubtedly depends on the theoretical attitudes of the author himself and on his personal historical conception. The historicism of rationality is connected with the way in which philosophical and scientific reflection on the forms of rationality existing in culture is carried out in a given period, in the form of effective mechanisms of activity, communication, and thinking, against the background of existing socio-political and economic relations. Developing this idea, Ukrainian philosophers emphasize that “rationality develops from the purposeful organization of practical activity and is constituted as a phenomenon of reason, making its way through forms of spiritual activity, including linguistic consciousness, communication, and culture in the broad sense” [1, p. 89].

According to the criterion of the dominant methodology, the following types of rationality are distinguished in domestic philosophy: scientific, cultural-historical, and general-philosophical.

A methodological classification of rationalities can be proposed through the prism of substantivist and normativist attitudes. Substantivism of rationality manifests itself in its understanding as a property of any object (science – scientific rationality; society – social rationality). Normativism is expressed in the view of rationality as a measure of the perfection of cognition and activity, which one should strive for even if it cannot be achieved. Rationality is perceived not as a property of a cultural phenomenon, but as a relation to it on the part of a certain community.

The well-known Austrian sociologist Max Weber distinguished four types of rationality, mixing classification criteria: practical, theoretical, substantive, and formal. Practical rationality presupposes actions of the individual aimed at satisfying pragmatic, egoistic interests. In everyday life this consists in calculating effective means for achieving certain goals that are approved and accepted by society. Theoretical rationality concerns the comprehension of the world through such cognitive procedures as deduction, induction, the identification of correlations between phenomena, etc.

Substantive rationality, according to M. Weber, is based on a certain set of values, which may differ significantly across cultures. Therefore, formal rationality is more significant, since it presupposes a clear understanding of the goals of activity and the selection of the most optimal means of achieving them. Formal rationality corresponds to the spirit of capitalism – “a type of thinking characterized by a systematic and rational striving for legitimate profit within one’s profession” [2, p. 85]. Formal rationality presupposes the universal application of rules, laws, and technical means of regulating social life.

According to the content of the object of rationality, J. Habermas distinguishes substantive rationality, characteristic of religious and metaphysical worldviews, and

procedural rationality of modernity, with its possibility of providing validity to our thoughts in such spheres as objective knowledge, moral-practical intuition, and aesthetic judgments [3, p. 182]. Communicative rationality should also be attributed to procedural rationality.

An extensive classification of types of rationality was developed by H. Schnädelbach [4]. In terms of systematicity and theoretical completeness, his theory of rationality stands in opposition to the “philosophy of reason,” the traditional view of rationality. The philosophy of reason is characterized by its focus on a specific scientific context (rationality of science, society, game theory, decision-making) and by a rudimentary understanding of rationality as the capacity for justification, as if “natural rationality” (animal rationale) could do nothing other than think, act, justify, meditate, solve problems, and play [4, p. 214].

Instead of the “philosophy of reason,” H. Schnädelbach proposes a “theory of philosophical rationality,” aimed, first, at integrating existing debatable views in which rationality is understood rather narrowly; second, at differentiating the rational and the reasonable in contemporary linguistic practice; and third, at the thematization of everything that constitutes the rationalitas of the animal rationale. According to this theory, he distinguishes the following types of rationality constituted in contemporary philosophical knowledge:

1. Rationality as justification, which includes types of objective-linguistic justification. This means that philosophical rationality pertains not only to thoughts, beliefs, intentions, and decisions, but, beginning with I. Kant, also to the grounds and causes of the state of the world or events within it. H. Schnädelbach proposes four objective-linguistic types of rationality based on the oppositional pairs “objective/subjective” and “theoretical/practical”:

- objective-theoretical, or cognitive justifications, which answer the question “Why is the statement ‘p’ possible?”;

- objective-practical, or normative justifications, which answer the question “Why should the goal contained in the statement ‘p’ be achieved?”;
- subjective-theoretical, or epistemic justifications, which answer the question “Why do you believe or assume that this statement ‘p’?”;
- subjective-practical, or intentional justifications, which answer the question “Why was/is achieved what is stated in the statement ‘p’?”

In different philosophical systems, one or another type predominates, or there are also types that presuppose or include others.

2. Discursive rationality, which takes place in argumentation as a linguistic action. Here the issue is not about states of affairs, but about assertions, assumptions, expectations, about the achievement or non-achievement of states of affairs, including related or advanced particular claims.

3. Communicative rationality, which is understood more broadly than ordinary rationality. Communicative rationality delineates the domain of what is understood, not only what is expressed.

4. Symbolic, or anthropometric, rationality, to which all the previous types are reduced.

In the socio-philosophical conceptions of K. Mannheim and K. Popper, types of rationality are derived from the principle of freedom of subjective existence. Thus, K. Mannheim, distinguishing between functional and substantive rationality, is guided by the criterion of the individual’s ability in a given type of society to assume personal responsibility and to plan his or her own life [349].

Karl Popper divides societies into “closed” (collectivist) and “open,” in which individuals are compelled to make personal decisions. Accordingly, “closed” and “open” types of rationality are distinguished [5].

In practical philosophy, V. Hösle distinguishes ethical rationality and goal-oriented rationality, based on the opposition between “being” and “ought” [6]. In his view, the fundamental dichotomy consists precisely in theoretical and practical

rationalities, between which there are no relations of subordination, since each form may be considered from the perspective of the other. The assertions of theoretical rationality are valid not only for science but also for philosophy. Theory here is understood in the ancient sense as the highest level of knowledge, the grasp of essence. The necessity of a philosophical theory of rationality is explained by the fact that the rejection of metaphysics inevitably entails the rejection of the value of rationality. With regard to the special sciences, metaphysics performs the same function as value rationality does in relation to goal-oriented rationality in the sphere of practical philosophy [6, pp. 75–78].

K.-O. Apel is a representative of the tradition in philosophy that recognizes the primacy of reason and consistently opposes all forms of skepticism, relativism, and naturalism. Apel developed one of the original concepts of rationality in XX century philosophy, which not only provides responses to the crisis of classical rationalism but also outlines the projection of its development under conditions of a globalizing world. Apel defines rationality as “the human capacity for justification and the autonomous constitution of the contents of one’s consciousness.” According to this conception, there exist many types of rationality, within each of which its own system of perspectives and coordinates is established.

Apel bases his concept of rational types on the philosophical tradition of self-critique and self-differentiation of reason. The critique of reason is a capacity of reason itself and is inseparable from its essence; however, it must be carried out from the standpoint of rationality, not irrationalism, as sometimes happens under contemporary conditions. He emphasizes that the classical modern European understanding of rationality only fuels the irrationalist critique of reason.

Apel raises the question of the rational type from whose standpoint a genuine critique of reason can take place. Such an approach, which requires reflection and consideration of one’s own type of rationality, decisively orients thought toward a transcendental-philosophical, rather than empirical (as in Weber), theory of types of

rationality. Thus, the construction of a theory of types of rationality presupposes a reconstructive and self-reflexive movement oriented toward the postulate of self-understanding. In other words, the transcendental self-justification of rationality in the course of argumentative discourse itself becomes the natural type of rationality that underlies the theory of rational types.

He does not claim to create an exhaustive overview or hierarchy of types of rationality. Instead, the highest type of rationality is discursive rationality, to which are attached not formal-logical or scientific rationality, but consensual-communicative and ethical rationalities: “the very presupposition of the rationality of the empirical sciences presupposes the rationality of ethics” [7, p. 24]. According to Apel, consensual-communicative rationality presupposes norms and rules that lie beyond calculative interest. Comparing consensual-communicative and instrumental-strategic rationality, Apel gives preference to the former. By advancing universal claims to validity (intelligibility, truth, truthfulness, normativity, correctness), it orients not toward conditional empirical goals, but toward an instance of absolutely normative significance.

Through communication, partners are conveyed information not about accidental empirical motives and subjective interests, but about universal, generally valid norms. In the work *The Human Situation as an Ethical Problem*, he writes: “Both forms of rationality are corresponding forms of interaction, or (in other words) communication, between human beings as acting subjects. However, only consensual-communicative rationality has as its presupposition rules or norms that lie a priori beyond the calculated self-interest of individuals; strategic rationality, by contrast, is grounded solely on the empirical reciprocity of the application of instrumental-technical rationality of action in relations between people” [19, p. 245].

Having emphasized that discursive rationality is the highest type of rationality, we also encounter an opposing view, according to which, within the framework of consensual-communicative rationality, Apel proposes to distinguish discursive

rationality, by means of which situations can be overcome when claims to validity are problematized. Argumentative discourse is communication about the truth of the judgments advanced, the explicated part of which is philosophical-reflexive discourse. Discursive rationality is the foundation of every type of rationality.

From proving the non-strategic character of discursive rationality, Apel derives the existence of ethical rationality, within which the justification of ethical norms takes place. Ethical rationality presupposes the existence of an autonomous ethical reason that contains laws in the Kantian sense. An ethical goal must be justified by the rational principle of generalized reciprocity. A higher goal can acquire ethical significance when it is capable of achieving universal consensus. “Thus, only when the normative condition of the sought agreement becomes the criterion of consensuality for all participants, and not only for the parties to the conflict, can the model of agreement become ethically relevant. Only in this case, which from the outset excludes agreement at the expense of a third party through the principle of generalized reciprocity, can one speak of agreement in the sense of consensual-communicative rationality as ethical rationality” [8, p. 246].

Arguing his position, Apel gives the example of a model of reaching agreement in a conflict according to the principles of strategic rationality, when, ignoring ideological differences, the parties attempt to converge on a unifying higher goal that corresponds to common interests. According to such a scheme, political and economic problems are successfully resolved. However, the results of such agreements can be ethically relevant only when they take into account not only the immediate participants in the conflict, but also all possible interested parties, and exclude agreements at the expense of third persons. It is evident that such a formulation of the issue cannot arise within the framework of strategic rationality; it requires going beyond it into the space of communicative-consensual rationality. Such a level of agreement also presupposes a high degree of societal consciousness, which should be reflected in theoretical developments.

“I am astonished,” writes K.-O. Apel, “that precisely in the situation of the modern world, when, thanks to technology, economy, and communication, the unity of human history has for the first time emerged as a reality, and when people daily confront problems of shared responsibility that must be resolved collectively, the academic sphere proposes such an anachronistic return to particular traditions of individual forms of life” [9, p. 404].

A review of types of rationality would be incomplete without mentioning systemic rationality, since it is precisely within the rationality of social systems that one can speak of political or economic ethics, of their institutional or social dimension, and of the ethical problems of globalization in general. Owing to the possibility of transcending systemic rationality – and thus of reflecting upon it and influencing it – each individual acquires the possibility of “entering twice” into the concept of ethics of responsibility: first as a “powerless” individual subject to systemic dependencies, and then as a member of a communicative community who, together with others, is responsible for institutions and systems. Scientific rationality of causal analysis presupposes technological rationality of goal-oriented action, which in turn presupposes hermeneutic rationality of understanding and mutual understanding, and within it – ethical rationality.

K.-O. Apel proposes a typology of four forms of rationality, each of which justifies the previous one: scientific, technological, hermeneutic, and ethical. Technological rationality is divided into instrumental rationality, realized in subject-object relations, and strategic rationality, which concerns subject-subject relations. Hermeneutic and ethical rationalities in Apel’s thought can be combined under the general name “communicative rationality,” since both are grounded in the concept of communication.

As can be seen from the above, K.-O. Apel employs a more elaborate typologization of rationalities, which cannot be reduced to only four types. The spectrum of rationalities considered by the philosopher includes discursive, formal-

logical, mathematical, strategic, systemic, technical, consensual-communicative, and others. According to his own admission, the number of such types may be infinite. From this follows the task of mediating competing rationalities within the framework of a long-term strategy of gradual approximative convergence of paradigms and rationalities in the sense of overcoming tensions and incompatibilities between different approaches.

Such a diversity of approaches to the typologization of rationalities demonstrates that rationality should be interpreted not as a purely abstract-logical category, but as a sociocultural phenomenon with a complex internal organization. The concept of rationality must be relevant for the analysis of forms and modes of thinking, models of behavior, and practices of activity. At the same time, it is called upon to record, reflect, and evaluate the presence and specificity of existing forms of social organization.

Conclusions. Summarizing the material, it should be noted that the pluralization of types of rationality reflects the aspiration to extend rationalist analysis beyond scientific knowledge and to encompass various spheres of human life activity – culture, morality, communication, and social institutions. The identification and typologization of rationalities appear as a necessary condition for their theoretical comprehension. It is precisely classifications, rather than isolated definitions, that form the semantic context within which rationality is revealed as a sociocultural and historically variable phenomenon. The historical approach makes it possible to relate forms of rationality to the dominant worldview orientations of particular epochs, demonstrating the dependence of the content of the rational on the mental and cultural environment. The various typologies proposed by M. Weber, J. Habermas, H. Schnädelbach, K. Mannheim, K. Popper, V. Hösle, and K.-O. Apel testify to the methodological multidimensionality of the problem of rationality. They emphasize that rationality may appear as instrumental, value-oriented, communicative, discursive, ethical, or systemic, depending on the research

perspective and theoretical attitudes of the author. The concept of consensual-communicative and discursive rationality developed by K.-O. Apel remains particularly relevant today. It makes it possible to overcome the limitations of strategic and instrumental thinking by bringing to the fore the ethical dimension of rationality, grounded in the principles of generalized reciprocity, responsibility, and the possibility of universal consensus. Discursive rationality thus emerges as the foundation for the justification of norms, values, and forms of social interaction in a globalized world. Consequently, contemporary philosophy of rationality is characterized not only by a multiplicity of types, but also by the need for their mutual mediation.

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